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Abstract
This paper explores the implications of the possibility of a
shift in environmental damages on the participation in en-
vironmental treaties. Using a two-period model where the
probability of a regime shift increases in the first-period pol-
lution stock, we examine the issue of coalition formation
under both fixed and dynamic membership. Our analysis
suggests that endogenous uncertainty may increase partic-
ipation. We find that full cooperation may be sustained,
but only in the presence of endogenous uncertainty. In-
terestingly, when the shift in the environmental damage is
large enough, the model provides a way to solve the “puz-
zle of small coalitions” found in the literature related to
international environmental agreements. We also find that
in period 1 (period 2) endogenous uncertainty leads to a
lower (higher) pollution stock under dynamic membership
as compared to the fixed membership case.
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1. Introduction
There is a growing scientific consensus that excessive greenhouse gas emis-
sions accumulation can trigger abrupt changes in global climatic patterns.
For instance, greenhouse gas emissions are slowing down the thermohaline
circulation in the Northern Atlantic Ocean. There is a threat that this ther-
mohaline circulation will abruptly shut down once an unknown threshold
of greenhouse gas concentration is surpassed. Such a change can potentially
result in large environmental damages (see IPCC, 2007).
A number of authors have analyzed the possibility of environmental dis-
ruption in the case of a single polluter; see, for instance, Clarke and Reed
(1994), Tsur and Zemel (1998), Haurie and Moresino (2006), de Zeeuw
and Zemel (2012). Nkuiya (2011) extends their analysis to a differential
pollution game among an arbitrary number of countries whose production
and consumption activities entail pollution. All the papers in this literature
analyze the problem either within the fully cooperative or the fully noncoop-
erative framework, or both. The cooperative setting assumes that countries
cooperate at any point in time. However, due to the lack of supranational
authority, such a solution may be viewed as extreme. On the other hand, the
noncooperative solution may not be appropriate for transboundary pollu-
tion problems; analyzing such environmental changes within the framework
of international negotiations may thus be an interesting alternative.
The possibility of an endogenous regime change (in environmental
damages), which has been used as a stylized fact within the scientific com-
munity, has not been modeled yet in the literature on dynamic environmen-
tal games. The purpose of this paper is to study how the prospect of such a
sudden shift in environmental damages affects the participation in climate
treaties and the emissions of the countries. We consider a world constituted
of an arbitrary number of countries involved in polluting production activ-
ities. Pollution is considered as a global and pure public bad which harms
all countries. In our model, current pollution stock can exacerbate future
environmental damages. More precisely, an upward shift in environmental
damages (suffered by countries) may occur in the future with a positive prob-
ability (which is increasing in current pollution stock), giving rise to what we
call “endogenous uncertainty.”1 This raises a number of research questions.
How does this type of uncertainty affect the participation in climate treaties?
How does it affect the countries’ emission policies? How does the magni-
tude of such a shift in environmental damages affect the incentives to ratify
environmental treaties?
In order to address these questions, we consider the concept of inter-
national environmental agreements (IEAs) introduced by Carraro and Sinis-
calco (1993) and Barrett (1994). An IEA is a two-stage game. In the first
1 Throughout the paper, we use the term “exogenous uncertainty” to refer to the case
where the probability of the upward shift is constant.
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stage (membership game), each country decides whether or not to ratify the
treaty. In the second stage (emissions game), the signatories choose their
emission strategies cooperatively, while the nonsignatories act unilaterally.
This basic framework has been used in both static and dynamic membership
games (see, for example, Rubio and Ulph, 2006, 2007; Nkuiya, 2012).
We consider a two-period dynamic game within a Cournot framework.
We examine the effects of a possible shift in environmental damages (which
can occur under exogenous uncertainty or endogenous uncertainty) within
the fully noncooperative setting. Our results indicate that endogenous
uncertainty leads to lower emissions today and higher emissions tomorrow.
However, it always lowers the pollution stock in both periods. That is in com-
parison with the cases where there is exogenous uncertainty about the future
damages of pollution.
We then examine the issue of coalition formation under fixed member-
ship when countries commit to their membership decision for both periods.
Our analysis suggests that, under exogenous uncertainty, a coalition of size
larger than two cannot be sustained. However, endogenous uncertainty may
increase the size of the stable coalition. We also find that, under endoge-
nous uncertainty, the grand coalition may emerge as the stable coalition. The
results are maintained under dynamic membership for exogenous
uncertainty, when countries negotiate an IEA at the outset of each period.2
However, for the endogenous uncertainty case, the grand coalition may be
sustained in period 1 while themodel generates a coalition of size not greater
than two in period 2. Interestingly enough, our findings suggest that consid-
ering the possibility of a shift in environmental damages is one route to solve
the puzzle of small coalitions found in the literature on IEAs.3 We also con-
trast our results under fixed and dynamic membership setups. We find that
under endogenous uncertainty, dynamic membership leads to a lower pollu-
tion stock in period 1 but a higher one in period 2 when compared to fixed
membership. Finally, we find that, for most of parameter values used in the
simulations, fixed membership results in relatively larger coalitions.
Our model also builds on the IEA literature with uncertainty and learn-
ing. Ulph (2004) studies how the prospect of getting better information
about the future can affect the ability of countries to ratify an IEA. To analyze
this issue, he incorporates uncertainty about damages in each of the two peri-
ods in the model of Rubio and Ulph (2002). He then compares the resulting
outcome to that of the model where there is no uncertainty in period 2 in
order to measure the effect of learning (which results in larger stable IEAs).
Our approach differs on two counts. First, uncertainty has always been con-
sidered to be exogenous in that literature. Nevertheless, human activities can
2 Rubio and Ulph (2002), Ulph (2004), and Nkuiya (2012) use the dynamic and/or the
fixed membership framework to address different questions.
3 For a detailed discussion, see Finus (2003).
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influence the occurrence of a dangerous event, thus making uncertainty en-
dogenous. This feature is taken into account in the present paper. Second,
we consider a particular type of uncertainty. The period-1 damage function
is known with certainty. However, unlike what has been assumed in the pre-
vailing IEA literature, the pollution stock of period 1 affects the probability
of an upward shift in the environmental damage of period 2.4
The paper unfolds as follows. The upcoming Section 2 presents the
model. The noncooperative equilibrium is derived in Section 3. Assuming
a quadratic damage function, Section 4 and Section 5 examine the member-
ship game under fixed membership and dynamic membership, respectively.
Finally, Section 6 makes concluding comments.
2. The Model
We consider a world constituted of N countries (with N ≥ 3), with two pe-
riods t = 1, 2. We use i = 1, 2, ...,N to refer to an arbitrary country. As the
result of their production and consumption activities, countries emit a global
pollutant. We assume for simplicity that, in each period, one unit of pro-
duction in any of the countries generates one unit of pollution. Country i ’s
benefit function is given by U (e it), t = 1, 2, where U is an increasing and
concave utility function, and e it is i ’s emission level at date t . Following Ulph
(2004) and Rubio and Ulph (2002), we assume that total emissions accumu-
late according to the law of motion:
Et =
N∑
i=1
e it + ρEt−1, E0 = 0, (1)
where Et denotes the pollution stock of period t and 1 − ρ is the natural
decay of accumulated emissions, where ρ ∈ (0, 1). Pollution is a global pub-
lic bad and it inflicts an environmental damage on each country. We con-
sider two states of the damage function, the business as usual state where the
damage function is D, and the dangerous state, which is characterized by the
damage function D + θ¯ .
In period 1 (the present), the damage function is perfectly known and
is in the business as usual state. However, the period-1 pollution stock (E1)
increases the likelihood of the occurrence of the dangerous state of damages
in period 2 (the future). To capture these features, we assume that in period
1, θ1 is known and is equal to zero, whereas θ2 is a binomial random variable
which can take the values θ¯ [with probability P(E1)] or 0 [with probability
1 − P(E1)]. The parameter θ¯ is a positive number, which represents the level
4 We assume that the magnitude of the damage shift and its probability (given global emis-
sions) are known. Although one may think of situations where these conditions are not
met, our model improves on the standard IEA literature (which assumes that the damages
of emissions are either known with certainty or random with an exogenous probability).
756 Journal of Public Economic Theory
of loss inflicted by the upward shift in the damages. Specifically, the damage
function in period t is Dt(Et) = D(Et) + θt , t = 1, 2, where D is an increasing
and convex function, which satisfies D′(0) = 0 and limE→+∞ D′(E ) = +∞.
We assume that the probability P(E1) is an increasing, piecewise twice
differentiable and convex function of the period-1 pollution stock, with
P(0) = P ′(0) = 0. (2)
In the remainder of this paper, exogenous uncertainty refers to scenar-
ios where P ′ = 0 while endogenous uncertainty refers to cases where P ′ = 0.
Notice that the case where the function P is identically equal to zero corre-
sponds to the model with no shift in damages, whereas the situation where P
is identically equal to one corresponds to the model where there is certainty
about the shift in the damage function. We now turn to the fully noncooper-
ative solution, which provides the Nash equilibrium outcome.
3. The Noncooperative Equilibrium
The game is solved using backward induction, starting from the second pe-
riod. In period 2, each country decides unilaterally the emission level that
maximizes its expected net benefit, considering the emission levels of other
countries as given. Formally, country i solves
maxe i2 Eπi2(e i2, E2) = [U (e i2) − D(E2) − θ¯P(E1)],
subject to : E2 =
∑N
i=1 e i2 + ρE1.
The first-order conditions for this maximization problem are
U ′(e i2) = D′
(
N∑
i=1
e i2 + ρE1
)
, i = 1, ...,N . (3)
These conditions indicate that each country chooses the period-2 emission
level that equates its marginal benefit of emissions and its marginal dam-
age from pollution (given the emission strategies of the others). We restrict
attention to symmetric equilibria. Letting e2n denote the emission level of
each country in period 2, we can rewrite (3) as
U ′(e2n) = D′(N e2n + ρE1). (4)
Differentiating the two sides of (4) with respect to E1 and rearranging, we
get
e ′2n(E1) =
ρD′′(N e2n + ρE1)
U ′′(e2n) − ND′′(N e2n + ρE1) < 0.
Notice that in (4), e2n(E1) is the inter-temporal emission rule. Since it has a
negative slope, if the pollution stock of period 1 increases then each country
will respond by reducing its emission level in the second period.
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In period 1, anticipating on the emission rule of the second period given
by (4), each country decides the emission rate that maximizes its expected
discounted net benefit. Therefore, each country i solves the problem:
max
e i1
{[πi1(e i1, E1) + δEπi2(e2n, E2)] = [U (e i1) − D(E1)] + δ[U (e2n)
−D(N e2n + ρE1) − θ¯P(E1)]},
where δ ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor.
For a symmetric equilibrium, a necessary condition for an interior solu-
tion is
U ′(e1n) − D′(N e1n) + δ[U ′(e2n)e ′2n − D′(E2n)(N e ′2n + ρ) − θ¯P ′(N e1n)] = 0,
where E2n = N e2n + Nρe1n.
Making use of (4), this condition can be rewritten as
U ′(e1n) = D′(N e1n) + δ[(ρ + (N − 1)e ′2n)D′(N e2n + Nρe1n) + θ¯P ′(N e1n)]. (5)
Equation (5) gives the period-1 optimality condition stating that each coun-
try’s marginal benefit of emissions must be equal to its intertemporal
marginal damage. The term θ¯P ′(N e1n) captures the effects of a possible
upward shift in the damages. Notice that this term would vanish if uncer-
tainty was exogenous (P ′ = 0). We check in the Appendix that an interior
solution always exists under our assumptions.
PROPOSITION 1: In the noncooperative equilibrium, emissions under endogenous uncer-
tainty are lower in period 1, but higher in period 2 (in comparison with the case without a shift
in the damage function).
Proof: See the Appendix. 
Proposition 1 shows that countries emit less in period 1 when faced with
endogenous uncertainty about the shift in the damages. In period 2, each
country emits more than it would when a shift in the damages is not pos-
sible. The intuition behind these results can be explained by the fact that
countries have incentives to emit less in period 1, given that their period-1
pollution stock increases the probability of an upward shift in the damages.
In addition, the optimal emissions in period 2 are decreasing in the period-1
pollution stock. Since countries produce less in period 1, it then follows that
the emissions in period 2 are higher (than they would be without a shift).
To better understand the pure effect of uncertainty, one can compare
the results of Proposition 1 to the outcome of the model where the probabil-
ity of the shift in period 2 is exogenous (P ′ = 0). As a result, the noncooper-
ative equilibrium emission decisions are the same under either certainty or
exogenous uncertainty. Using (5), we can see that the inter-temporal
marginal damages when the shift probability is exogenous are smaller than
those obtained under endogenous uncertainty. An argument similar to the
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one used for Proposition 1 allows us to conclude that, in comparison to the
case where the probability of the shift is exogenous, we have: (a) the period-
1 emissions under certainty are greater and (b) the period-2 emissions are
lower.
The above results show that endogenous uncertainty about an upward
shift in the damages leads to a reduction in period-1 pollution stock if coun-
tries act noncooperatively.5 We next examine the effects of endogenous
uncertainty on the size of stable international environmental agreements.
In the remainder of the paper, we assume that
U (e it) = ae it − b2 e
2
i t , t = 1, 2, (6)
where a and b are positive parameters.6 Since U reaches its maximum at
a/b , the total emissions (in equilibrium) will never exceed Na/b when the
damages are taken into account.
We also assume that
D(Et) = γ2 E
2
t , t = 1, 2,
where γ is a positive parameter.
4. IEAs with Fixed Membership
In this section, we incorporate endogenous uncertainty into the dynamic
version of the canonical IEA membership game. An IEA is a two-stage game
where, in the first stage (membership game), each country decides whether
or not to ratify the treaty. In the second stage, signatories jointly choose their
emissions, while each nonsignatory chooses its emissions noncooperatively.
Using a Cournot framework, we solve the game by backward induction start-
ing from the second stage.
4.1. The Emissions Game
Assume that an IEA is negotiated at the beginning of period 1, which results
in the set of signatories S, with n ≤ N being the cardinality of S. In this set
up, every country commits to their membership decision for the two periods
(there is no renegotiation at the outset of period 2).7
5 We have shown that all the results of this section also hold qualitatively under full coop-
eration in the two periods.
6 This specification is used in a number of papers in this literature. Among many others
and in a deterministic framework, Dockner and Long (1993) use a quadratic benefit func-
tion in a dynamic game with two players. Rubio andUlph (2006) use the same specification
but in a static IEA game.
7 This assumption will be relaxed further on.
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In period 2, signatories solve
maxe i2,i∈S
∑
i∈S
Eπi2(e i2, E2) =
∑
i∈S
[
ae i2 − b2 e
2
i2 −
γ
2
(E2)2 − θ¯P(E1)
]
,
subject to : E2 =
N∑
i=1
e i2 + ρE1.
The typical nonsignatory i ∈ N \ S solves
maxe i2 Eπi2(e i2, E2) =
[
ae i2 − b2 e
2
i2 −
γ
2
(E2)2 − θ¯P(E1)
]
,
subject to : E2 =
N∑
i=1
e i2 + ρE1.
For the symmetric equilibria, the first-order conditions for the respective
maximization problems above are
a − be2s = nγ E2, (7)
a − be2ns = γ E2, (8)
where E2 = ne2s + (N − n)e2ns + ρE1.8 Solving (7) and (8), we get the inter-
temporal decision rule for the emissions of signatories and nonsignatories,
respectively
e2s = ab − aγ (N − n)(n − 1) − bnγρE1b(b + γ (N − n + n2)) , (9)
e2ns = ab + an(n − 1)γ − bγρE1b(b + γ (N − n + n2)) . (10)
In period 1, signatories decide jointly the emission levels that maximize
their expected discounted net welfare. More formally, they solve
max
e i1,i∈S
{∑
i∈S
[πi1(e i1, E1) + δEπi2(e i2, E2)] =
∑
i∈S
[
ae i1 − b2 e
2
i1 −
γ
2
(E1)2
]
+nδ
[
ae2s − b2 e
2
2s −
γ
2
(E2)2
−θ¯P(E1)
]}
,
where E2 = ne2s + (N − n)e2ns + ρE1.
8 Condition (7) is in fact the Samuelson (1954) condition for the provision of a public
good within the coalition S, which states that the marginal benefit of each coalition mem-
ber is equal to the sum of the marginal damages of all the coalition members.
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A nonsignatory i ∈ N \ S solves
max
e i1
{
[πi1(e i1, E1) + δEπi2(e2ns , E2)] =
[
ae i1 − b2 e
2
i1 −
γ
2
(E1)2
]
+δ
[
ae2ns − b2 e
2
2ns −
γ
2
(E2)2
−θ¯P(E1)
]}
,
subject to: E2 = ne2s + (N − n)e2ns + ρE1.
In a symmetric equilibrium, given (7) and (8), the first-order conditions
for signatories and nonsignatories are, respectively,
a − be1s = nγ E1 − nδ[nγ E2e ′2s − γ (ne ′2s + (N − n)e ′2ns + ρ)
×E2 − θ¯P ′(E1)], (11)
a − be1ns = γ E1 − δ[γ E2e ′2ns − γ (ne ′2ns + (N − n)e ′2ns + ρ)E2 − θ¯P ′(E1)].
(12)
Using a similar reasoning as in the noncooperative scenario, it can be
shown that in period 1 and for any coalition of size n, the signatories’ emis-
sions as well as the nonsignatories’ emissions are lower under endogenous
uncertainty in comparison with the certainty framework. But these results do
not hold in period 2.
The above derivations suggest that the case of exogenous uncertainty
(P ′ = 0) leads to the same emission and membership decisions as the cer-
tainty case and the no-shift case. Therefore, in order to examine the effect
of a possible upward shift in damages, we will from now on contrast the out-
come of endogenous uncertainty with that of exogenous uncertainty.
Multiplying (11) by n and (12) by N − n, we get
na − b E1s = n2γ E1 − n2δ[nγ E2e ′2s − γ (ne ′2s + (N − n)e ′2ns + ρ)
×E2 − θ¯P ′(E1)],
(13)
(N − n)a − b E1ns = (N − n)γ E1 − (N − n)δ[γ E2e ′2ns − γ (ne ′2ns
+(N − n)e ′2ns + ρ)E2 − θ¯P ′(E1)],
(14)
where E1s and E1ns are the total emissions of signatories and nonsignatories
(that is to say period-1 pollution stock is E1 = E1s + E1ns). Adding up side by
side (13) and (14) yields
Na − b E1 = (N − n + n2)γ E1 + δ[(N − n + n2)(ne ′2s + (N − n)e ′2ns + ρ)γ E2
−(n3e ′2s + (N − n)e ′2ns)γ E2 + (N − n + n2)θ¯P ′(E1)].
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Using the fact that
E2 = ne2s + (N − n)e2ns + ρE1 = Na + bρE1b + γ (N − n + n2) , (15)
this condition can be rewritten as
Na(1 − α(n)) = (d(n) + α(n)bρ)E1 + δ(N − n + n2)θ¯P ′(E1), (16)
where d(n) = b + γ (N − n + n2) and α(n) = δγρ[(N − n + n2)b + (N − n +
n4)γ ]/d(n)2.
PROPOSITION 2: For a given coalition size n ∈ [1,N ], the pollution stock in both
periods under endogenous uncertainty is always lower than under exogenous uncertainty.
Proof: Using a similar reasoning as in Proposition 1, it can be shown that E1
is smaller under endogenous uncertainty. Making use of (15), we establish
that E2 is lower under endogenous uncertainty. 
Proposition 2 indicates that countries adopt a cautious behavior under
the possibility of a shift in environmental damages. For the polar cases where
n = 1 or n = N , this result implies that endogenous uncertainty always low-
ers the pollution stock for both periods under the noncooperative and the
cooperative scenarios, respectively.
Solving Condition 16 determines E1(n), which is the pollution stock of
period 1 given the coalition of size n. Substituting E1(n) into (9) and (10),
we get the equilibrium emission levels e2s(n), e2ns(n) of period 2. Likewise,
substituting E1(n) into (11) and (12) and rearranging, we obtain the emis-
sion equilibrium emission levels of period 1:
e1s(n) = {a − nγ E1(n) + nδ[nγ e ′2s E2(n) − γ (ne ′2s
+(N − n)e ′2ns + ρ)E2(n) − θ¯P ′(E1(n))]}/b ,
(17)
e1ns(n) = {a − γ E1(n) + δ[γ e ′2ns E2(n) − γ (ne ′2ns + (N − n)e ′2ns
+ρ)E2(n) − θ¯P ′(E1(n))]}/b ,
(18)
where E2(n) = ne2s + (N − n)e2ns + ρE1(n) denotes the pollution stock in
period 2.
Substituting the equilibrium emissions in the objective functions above,
we get the discounted payoffs of the typical signatory and the typical
nonsignatory, which are, respectively, given by
Vs(n) = ae1s(n) − b2 e1s(n)
2 − γ
2
E1(n)2 + δ
[
ae2s(n) − b2 e2s(n)
2
−γ
2
E2(n)2 − θ¯P(E1(n))
]
,
(19)
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Vns(n) = ae1ns(n) − b2 e1ns(n)
2 − γ
2
E1(n)2 + δ
[
ae2ns(n) − b2 e2ns(n)
2
−γ
2
E2(n)2 − θ¯P(E1(n))
]
.
(20)
RESULT 1: For any n ∈ [2,N − 1], (i) each nonmember of a coalition of size n
pollutes more than any individual member; (ii) each member of a coalition of size n
gains less than each nonmember.
Proof: It is clear from (9) and (10) that 0 < e2s < e2ns < a/b . From (17)
and (18), we have 0 < e1s(n) < e1ns(n) < a/b . Since the function U (x) =
ax − bx2/2 is increasing over the interval [0, a/b), we have: U (e1s(n)) <
U (e1ns(n)) and U (e2s(n)) < U (e2ns(n)). Using (19) and (20), we get
Vns(n) − Vs(n) = [U (e1ns(n)) − U (e1s(n))]
+ δ[U (e2ns(n)) − U (e2s(n))] > 0. 
Result 1 highlights the free riding incentive that affects the member-
ship game. Indeed, the abatement effort of signatories is greater than that of
nonsignatories. However, the benefit of abatement goes to all players, while
nonsignatories gain more from that abatement. Notice that for n = 1 and
n = N , this section retrieves the respective outcomes of the noncooperative
game and the cooperative game.
4.2. Stable Agreements
In what follows, we use the stability concept of D’Aspremont et al. (1983) to
determine the equilibrium of the membership game. It states that a coalition
of size n is stable or self-enforcing if it is both internally stable and externally
stable. A coalition of size n is internally stable if no member has incentives to
leave the coalition, while it is externally stable if no nonmember can increase
its payoff by joining the coalition.
For convenience, we summarize the stability conditions using the stabil-
ity function introduced by Hoel and Schneider (1997),
φi(n) = Vs(n) − Vns(n − 1), for n = 2, ...,N .
Clearly, φi(n) ≥ 0 for i ∈ S means that the coalition S of size n is internally
stable whereas φi(n + 1) < 0 for i ∈ N \ S means that any coalition S of size n
is externally stable. Notice that: (a) many stable coalitions may exist and (b)
a coalition whose size is the greatest integer for which the internal stability
holds is also externally stable. We therefore consider the largest coalition size
for which internal stability is verified to be self-enforcing.
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PROPOSITION 3: In the fixed membership framework, full cooperation may be
sustained as a stable agreement, but only under endogenous uncertainty.
Proof: To prove that full cooperation may be sustained, it is sufficient to pro-
vide an example. We run a numerical analysis on a set of N = 100 countries
to examine how endogenous uncertainty affects stable coalitions in period 1.
We consider the probability function
P(E1) = 2b
2
N 2a2
∫ E1
0
uI[0,aN /b](u)du =
{
b2E 21
N 2a2 , if E1 < aN /b
1, if E1 ≥ aN /b
, (21)
where I[0,aN /b](u) is the function that takes the value: one if u lies in the
interval [0, aN /b], and zero otherwise. Note that this specification of P sat-
isfies the requirements needed for our probability functions: it is increasing,
piecewise twice differentiable and convex, with P(0) = P ′(0) = 0. We use the
parameter values a = 5; b = 1; γ = 0.0001; δ = 0.9; and ρ = 0.95 (these val-
ues always result in nonnegative emissions when computing the stable coali-
tions). As θ¯ increases, the potential gain from cooperation (defined as the
difference between the gain from full cooperation and noncooperation)
rises. As a result, the incentive to adhere to the treaty rises accordingly.9 We
obtain two cases depending on the magnitude of the shift in the damages
function, and each case is associated with a distinct equilibrium. The first
case corresponds to a small shift in the damage function, i.e., θ¯ ∈ [0, 0.0065).
Our simulations reveal that the higher θ¯ is, the lager are stable coalitions. To
show that this result is possible only under endogenous uncertainty, we now
focus on the case θ¯ = 0.10
In this case, the model generates stable coalitions of two members; and
we perform a sensitivity analysis, which reveals that the size of a stable coali-
tion may not be greater than two. This is consistent with the result in Rubio
and Casino (2005) who analyze an IEA under fixed membership using a dif-
ferential game (with open-loop emission strategies). They find numerically
in their model, without uncertainty, that an IEA can sustain only a coalition
of size not greater than two. In our analysis, we use a two-period model with a
9 This result is contradictive to the standard argument based on Barrett (1994) who finds
that as the extensive margin of the coalition is smaller, the larger the global net benefit
from cooperation compared to noncooperation is. In our model, endogenous uncertainty
induces another source of divergence (in addition to the global pollution externality) be-
tween the individual and the socially optimal abatement, which increases the gap between
the global net benefits under cooperation and noncooperation as the magnitude of the
shift rises. Besides internalizing the global pollution externality, coalition formation under
endogenous uncertainty has now the advantage of internalizing the positive externality
with respect to the lower expected damage in period 2. We thank an anonymous referee
for this comment.
10 Notice that the stable coalition size under θ¯ = 0 is equal to the stable coalition size
under the exogenous probability case, which includes both the certainty case (P = 1) and
the no-shift in the damage case (P = 0).
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Figure 1: The effects of endogenous uncertainty on participation with fixed
membership and quadratic damages.
fixed membership strategy and we also find a two-member stable coalition in
the case without uncertainty. The second case is for a large shift in the dam-
age function, i.e., θ¯ ≥ 0.0065, which always leads to full cooperation. These
findings are illustrated in Figure 1. 
The rationale behind the results of Proposition 3 is that the intro-
duction of the endogenous probability into the IEA model generates an
inter-temporal positive externality. Endogenous uncertainty lowers the pol-
lution stock in both periods (which reduces the damages) and increases the
period-2 emissions (which increases the benefit): inter-temporal welfare
hence tends to increase. However, endogenous uncertainty also lowers
the period-1 emissions (which decreases the benefit), while it directly
reduces the inter-temporal welfare via the threat of the shift in damages. Our
analysis suggests that under endogenous uncertainty, the positive externality
can outweigh the negative one such that the grand coalition may emerge as
the stable coalition.
5. IEAs with Dynamic Membership
So far we have assumed that an IEA is negotiated once and for all at the
outset of period 1. In this section, we will examine the effects of endogenous
uncertainty when an IEA is negotiated at the beginning of each period.
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In period 2, given the pollution stock of the first period (E1), we assume
that an IEA is negotiated at the outset of period 2, which results in a coalition
S of size n. The optimal emissions of each signatory e2s(n) and those of each
nonsignatory e2ns(n) are defined, respectively, by (9) and (10).
The associated expected payoff of a signatory and that of a nonsignatory
for the period are, respectively,
W2s(n) = U (e2s(n)) − γ2 E2(n)
2 − θ¯P(E1), (22)
W2ns(n) = U (e2ns(n)) − γ2 E2(n)
2 − θ¯P(E1), (23)
where E2(n) is given by (15).
In this setting, the stability function is
φ2(n) = W2s(n) − W2ns(n − 1).
PROPOSITION 4: Under dynamic membership, any coalition of size n greater than
2 is not internally stable in period 2.
Proof: See the Appendix. 
Proposition 4 states that no coalition of more than two members can
be stable in period 2. This leaves us with only two-member coalitions as
potential candidates for stability. Depending on the parameters, the coali-
tions of size 2 may or may not be stable. We show in the Appendix that,
if the marginal damage parameter γ is sufficiently large (γ > γ¯ ≡ b[4 −
N + 2√N 2 − 3N + 3]/(3N + 2)(N − 2)), then no stable coalition can be
sustained by the model. However, if the marginal damage parameter γ is
sufficiently small (0 ≤ γ ≤ γ¯ ), the model generates stable coalitions of two
signatories in period 2.
We now turn to the analysis of coalition formation in period 1. Let us
first examine how membership decisions taken in period 1 affect the coun-
tries’ payoffs in period 2. Following Rubio and Ulph (2007), Ulph (2004),
and Nkuiya (2012), we use the Random Assignment Rule, which states that
countries cannot commit to their membership across the two periods. For-
mally, we assume that there is a binomial random variable whose realization
in period 1 determines whether or not a particular country will be among the
members in period 2. For any stable IEA of size n∗ in period 2, the a priori
probability of any given country being a member of the coalition is n∗/N . In
a symmetric equilibrium, this probability is the same for all countries. There-
fore, in period 1, each country has the same period-2 expected payoff, which
depends on the pollution stock of period 1.
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The common payoff that signatories as well as nonsignatories expect to
get in period 2 is
ψ(E1) = n
∗
N
W2s(n∗) +
(
1 − n
∗
N
)
W2ns(n∗),
where n∗ = 0 if γ > γ¯ and n∗ = 2 if 0 ≤ γ ≤ γ¯ .
This expression can be rewritten as11
ψ(E1) = U (e2s(n∗))n
∗
N
+
(
1 − n
∗
N
)
U (e2ns(n∗)) − γ2 E2(n
∗)2 − θ¯P(E1).
Assume that an IEA game is played at the outset of period 1, which results in
n signatories.
Signatories solve
max
e i1,i∈S
{∑
i∈S
[
ae i1 − b2 e
2
i1 −
γ
2
(E1)2
]
+ nδψ(E1)
}
.
A nonsignatory i ∈ N \ S solves
max
e i1
{[
ae i1 − b2 e
2
i1 −
γ
2
(E1)2
]
+ δψ(E1)
}
.
The first-order conditions for optimality are
a − be1s = nγ E1 + nδ
[
γρ
Nd(n∗)2
(Na + bρE1)(Nb + γ (N + n∗3 − n∗))
+θ¯P ′(E1)
]
, (24)
a − be1ns = γ E1 + δ
[
γρ
Nd(n∗)2
(Na + bρE1)(Nb + γ (N + n∗3 − n∗))
+θ¯P ′(E1)
]
. (25)
Multiplying (24) by n and (25) by (N − n) and adding up side by side
the two resulting equations, we obtain
Na − b E1 = (N − n + n2)γ E1 + (N − n + n2)δ
[
γρ
Nd(n∗)2
(Na + bρE1)(Nb
+γ (N + n∗3 − n∗)) + θ¯P ′(E1)
]
,
11 Notice that in the expression of ψ(E1), the terms e 2s(n∗), e 2ns(n∗), and E2(n∗) all depend
on E1.
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which can be rewritten as
a[N − β(n,n∗)] =
[
b + γ (N − n + n2) + bρ
N
β(n,n∗)
]
E1
+(N − n + n2)θ¯ δP ′(E1), (26)
where β(n,n∗) = (N − n + n2)γρδ(Nb + γ (N + n∗3 − n∗))/d(n∗),2
The positive root of (26) is the equilibrium pollution stock of period 1,
E1(n). Clearly, (26) shows that for any n ∈ [2,N − 1], the pollution stock of
period 1 is smaller under endogenous uncertainty than under exogenous
uncertainty.
Substituting E1(n) in (24) and (25), we get the respective equilibrium
emissions of a signatory and a nonsignatory country:
e1s(n) =
{
a − nγ E1(n) − nδ
[
γρ
Nd(n∗)2
(Na + bρE1(n))
(Nb + γ (N + n∗3 − n∗)) + θ¯P ′(E1(n))
]}
/b ,
e1ns =
{
a − γ E1(n) − δ
[
γρ
Nd(n∗)2
(Na + bρE1(n))
(Nb + γ (N + n∗3 − n∗)) + θ¯P ′(E1(n))
]}
/b .
Replacing the equilibrium emissions into the objective functions, we obtain
the respective payoff of a signatory and a nonsignatory:
W1s(n) = U (e1s(n)) − γ2 E1(n)
2 + δψ(E1(n)), (27)
W1ns(n) = U (e1ns(n)) − γ2 E1(n)
2 + δψ(E1(n)). (28)
The payoffs we have just derived are used to provide the following result
on coalition formation in period 1.
PROPOSITION 5: In the dynamic membership framework, full cooperation may be
sustained in period 1 (as a stable agreement), but only under endogenous uncertainty.
Proof: To prove that full cooperation may be sustained in period 1, it suffices
to provide an example. We carry out a numerical analysis on a set of N = 100
countries to study how endogenous uncertainty can impact stable coalitions
in period 1. We consider the probability function defined by (21) with the
parameter values a = 0.04; b = 1; γ = 0.0001; δ = 0.9; and ρ = 0.95 (which
always result in nonnegative emissions levels). Our findings are illustrated
in Figure 2. The number of signatories under exogenous certainty (P ′ = 0)
is equal to two. However, when endogenous uncertainty prevails, our anal-
ysis identifies two intervals of the magnitude of the shift in the damage
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Figure 2: The effects of endogenous uncertainty on period-1 participation with
dynamic membership and quadratic damages.
function (captured by the parameter θ¯) across which the equilibrium pat-
terns differ considerably. Below a given threshold for θ¯ , we find a positive
relationship between θ¯ and the number of signatories. However, above that
threshold, the model generates the fully cooperative equilibrium. These
results can be explained by the fact that as θ¯ tends to rise, the potential gain
from cooperation rises, increasing the incentive to ratify the treaty. Notice
that under exogenous uncertainty, we have P ′ = 0 and the probability disap-
pears from the stability function. Using the same argument as in the proof of
Proposition 4, it can be shown that the period-1 stable coalition size cannot
exceed two under exogenous uncertainty. 
The results we have established show that in the first period, the number
of signatories appears greater than under the exogenous uncertainty case
whether the IEAs are designed within the dynamic membership or within
the fixed membership framework.
We next examine the effects of a possible shift in damages on the pollu-
tion stock, and contrast the outcome of the fixed membership with the one
of the dynamic membership.
For the sake of tractability, we run a numerical simulation with b = 1, δ =
0.9, ρ = 0.95, and γ = 0.0001. We consider different values for (a,N , θ¯)
defined as ai+1 = ai + 0.01, a0 = 0.04, i = 0, . . . , 41; θ¯ j+1 = θ¯ j + 0.01, θ¯0 =
0, j = 0, . . . , 54; and N = 3, 10, 20, 50, 75, 100 along with the probability
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function (21). We find that endogenous uncertainty leads to a lower pol-
lution stock in both periods, and larger membership than under exogenous
uncertainty. This result appears to be robust under fixed and dynamic mem-
bership scenarios, and for all parameters adopted in the simulations.
We also find that, in period 1, endogenous uncertainty leads to a lower
pollution stock under dynamic membership as compared to the fixed mem-
bership case. However, this result is reversed in period 2. For most of the
parameter values used in the simulations, endogenous uncertainty leads to
at least a greater participation under fixed membership than under the dy-
namic membership case.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we have examined how the possibility of an upward shift in
environmental damages can affect the willingness of countries to adhere to
an IEA. To do this we have extended the traditional IEA membership model
by including endogenous uncertainty within a two-period framework. This
allows us to compare our results to the case where the probability of the
damage shift is exogenous. Our findings show that this type of uncertainty
has specific impacts on the equilibrium behavior. Endogenous uncertainty
appears to lower the pollution stock of both periods and increase the size of
self-enforcing coalitions in period 1 (the grand coalition can even emerge as
the stable coalition). This result can be attributed to the fact that as the mag-
nitude of the shift rises, the potential gain from cooperation for the initial
period tends to increase, raising the incentive to ratify the treaty. Fixed mem-
bership results in a lower pollution stock in the terminal period in contrast
to the dynamic membership approach.
Our results may have interesting ramifications within the IEA literature
that uses the Cournot approach (see Finus, 2003, for an overview of this
literature). When emission choices are simultaneous, the findings in the lit-
erature suggests that, the size of self-enforcing coalitions cannot be greater
than three. Using the Cournot approach, however, we find that considering
endogenous environmental risk provides a route to disentangle the puzzle
of small coalitions.
Our results also shed new light on the effects of uncertainty on the incen-
tives to ratify an IEA. A number of studies conclude that participation in IEAs
is greater under uncertainty than under certainty (see, e.g., Young, 1994; Na
and Shin, 1998). Our analysis suggests that it is not uncertainty per se, but
rather endogenous uncertainty, that may increase participation in IEAs. In
our model, uncertainty prevails in period 2, yet we have stable coalitions of
at most three members (just as in the traditional models) in this period.
For elucidation purposes, we have used a two-period model; consider-
ing more periods would not fundamentally change our results, however. In
such a framework and under dynamic membership, the puzzle of small coali-
tions would still hold for the last period (in which no coalition of size greater
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than two would be stable as suggested by Proposition 4). Moreover, full co-
operation would also emerge in some cases as a stable agreement in every
nonterminal period. In the fixed-membership scenario too, full cooperation
could possibly be generated with more than two periods. Furthermore, in
the presence of ex ante country heterogeneity, the possibility of the shift in
damages may have disparate effects on country incentives to join the treaties.
How exactly this feature may affect our results is an avenue to consider for
future research.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1:
(1) Proof of the fact that “emissions under endogenous uncertainty are
lower in period 1”
Denote by R(e1n, θ) the right-hand side of (5), that is
R(e1n, θ) = D′(N e1n) + δ[(ρ + (N − 1)e ′2n)D′(N e2n + Nρe1n) + θP ′(N e1n)],
for θ ∈ {0, θ¯} and e1n ≥ 0.
Since D′(0) = P ′(0) = 0, e ′2n(0) < 0, U ′′ < 0 and δ, ρ ∈ [0, 1] we have:
R(0, θ) = δ(ρ + (N − 1)e ′2n(0))D′(N e2n(0)) < D′(N e2n(0))
= U ′(e2n(0)) < U ′(0).
The existence of an interior solution in both cases (e1n(θ¯), e1n(0)) is guar-
anteed by the facts that U ′ is decreasing, R(0, θ) is lower than U ′(0), and
R(e1n, θ) has an infinite limit as e1n goes to infinity.
Notice that
R(e1n, θ¯) − R(e1n, 0) = δθ¯P ′(N e1n) > 0.
Thus, the marginal damage under endogenous uncertainty is greater than
the marginal damage under no uncertainty. As illustrated in Figure A1, the
period-1 emission level is smaller under endogenous uncertainty.
(2) Proof of the fact that “emissions under endogenous uncertainty are
greater in period 2”
Since period-1 pollution stock is lower under endogenous uncertainty
and e2n(E1) has a negative slope, the period-2 individual emission levels will
be higher under the endogenous uncertainty case. 
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Figure A1: Effects of uncertainty on the period-1 optimal emissions.
Proof of Proposition 4: Given E1, we have shown that the stability function can
be written as
φ2(n) = G(n) γ
2(n − 1)(Na + bρE1)2
2b(b + N γ − nγ + n2γ )2(b + 2γ + N γ − 3nγ + n2γ )2 ,
where G(n) = − γ 2n5 + 5γ 2n4 + γ (− 2b − 7γ − 2N γ )n3 + γ (8b +
3γ + 4N γ )n2 + (2N γ 2 − 2Nbγ − N 2γ 2 − b2 − 6bγ )n + (2Nbγ − N 2γ 2 +
3b2 + 4bγ ). Notice that the sign of this expression is determined by G(n).
Since G(3) = −4γ (N 2γ + 3N γ + b(N − 1)) < 0 and G(n + 1) −
G(n) = −((N − 4)N + n2)γ 2 − 2Nbγ − 2N (3n − 1)nγ 2 − b2 − 2bn(3n −
5)γ − 5n3(n − 2)γ 2 < 0 for all n ≥ 2, any coalition of size n ≥ 3 is not
internally stable.
G(2) = (2(2γ − b) − 3γN )γN + b2 + 8bγ + 4γ 2, which is positive if
and only if 0 ≤ γ ≤ γ¯ ≡ b[4 − N + 2√N 2 − 3N + 3]/(3N + 2)(N − 2).
As consequence, if γ > γ¯ no stable coalitions can be formed. However,
for 0 ≤ γ ≤ γ¯ stable coalitions are constituted of two members. 
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